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Jimmy Carter
The Power of Moral Suasion in
International Mediation

I was excited about my interview with Jimmy Carter. For several years, I had been following the development of the Carter Center¹ in Atlanta, Georgia, and its energetic commitment to the ideals and work of the former U.S. president. From my interest in mediation, I had read many accounts of the Camp David negotiations, and I was fascinated to learn that Carter was once again trying his hand at settling seemingly intractable conflicts. I also had heard from many who work with him of his intensity, intelligence, and warmth. Now I would finally get to meet this almost legendary man.

My interview took place at the Carter Center on a rainy spring morning in March 1990. The center is in a residential section of Atlanta on thirty acres of beautifully landscaped grounds. The four pavilions that then made up the center contained the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum; numerous nonprofit, international programs focusing on health, human rights, hunger, and conflict resolution; and conference and meeting facilities. Each pavilion has floor-to-ceiling windows that look out on the grounds and a beautiful Japanese garden. The interior spaces are decorated with presidential memorabilia and comfortably furnished for use as meeting and reception areas.

Carter's office is on the second level of one of the pavilions. As I reached the doorway and tentatively looked in, he looked up

from his desk and walked over to greet me. He looked older than I remembered (I had not seen him since he left office ten years earlier), but he projected energy and strength as he smiled warmly, shook my hand, and said how happy he was to speak with me. We sat in comfortable chairs at the opposite end of the office from his large desk. The atmosphere in the room was very soothing, with classical music playing softly and the large windows bringing the lush gardens into full view.

During the interview, I was struck first by Carter's attentiveness and focus. He keyed in immediately to my questions, and his concentration never wavered throughout our talk. My second impression was of the former president's obvious immersion in and commitment to the work of the center. He explained that intranational conflicts are the focus of his conflict resolution work; no international organization, he pointed out, has the jurisdiction to intervene and no national governments can negotiate with insurgency groups. He thus feels an "obligation" to work in these disputes, because of his access to the important actors and his unique, extra-governmental status. He is, in effect, building an institution from which to conduct private diplomacy.

Carter's current conflict resolution work is based in large part on his experience at Camp David—his "first love," as one associate framed it. To understand Carter's approach to mediation, one must first understand that historic 1978 meeting of Egypt's Anwar Sadat, Israel's Menachem Begin, and President Jimmy Carter, the mediator. That mediation has been well chronicled by scores of analysts and by Carter himself in his autobiographical work, *Keeping Faith*. My review of the history of events leading to the Camp David Accords and the Middle East peace process will be brief.

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After months of Carter's cajoling, bargaining, pleading, and worrying, the Egyptian and Israeli negotiating teams arrived at Camp David on September 4, 1978. Carter's preparation for his mediation role at Camp David had included immersion in personal profiles of Begin and Sadat.

This negotiation was highly personal for me, perhaps more than any of the others in which I was involved. Before I went to Camp David, I took a three- or four-day trip down the middle fork of the Salmon River and made a brief visit to Lake Jackson. As I typically did, I took along with me two thick briefing books that had been prepared for me by the psychologists in the intelligence agencies describing the two men with whom I would be negotiating. . . . The psychological profiles described these men, their characters, political origins, family backgrounds, obligations, allies, and enemies, and every possible consequence of a successful negotiation. By the time I got to Camp David, I knew a lot more about Begin and Sadat than they dreamed that I knew. Perhaps I knew some things that very few people knew. This gave me a chance to enmesh two highly diverse men in a successful negotiation. (Carter, 1987, pp. 6-7).

Carter met separately with Begin and then with Sadat, pushing each to be as flexible as possible and think creatively about solutions to longstanding problems. Sadat's primary concerns were the return of Egyptian territory, the sovereignty of the Palestinians, and the future relations of Israel with the other Arab nations. He was responsive to Carter's plan for aiming to negotiate a total settlement. Begin's primary interest was Israeli security, and he believed that the details of an agreement could

be worked out by the foreign ministers if the leaders could draw up general principles.

On the second and third days of the summit, Begin and Sadat met together with Carter. Contrary to Carter's hopes, the two men did not get along, and they did not meet together again for the remainder of the negotiation.

At Camp David, Carter continued to play the same role he had played in the months preceding the meeting in the Maryland hill country. He negotiated vigorously with each leader separately, focusing on both the general principles and difficult details of possible agreements. He took the lead in drafting comprehensive proposals, shuttling back and forth between Begin and Sadat to get their comments and changes. In all, Carter and his team drafted twenty-three versions of an agreement before the negotiations concluded.

Carter's most dramatic and effective approach to these two men was on the personal level. He consistently reminded them of the consequences of failing to reach an agreement, framed in the terms that mattered most to each. He appealed to what he believed to be both men's real desire for peace. He reminded each of the constraints that the other faced and of the compromises that the other had made to date, as well as assuring each of the other's good faith efforts. He used his position as U.S. president to underscore the importance of an agreement to relations between each country and the United States. And he let them know how far out on a limb he was, personally and politically, and how disastrous it would be for him as well as for them if no agreement was reached.

Two specific incidents warrant description, as they are striking examples of Carter's powerful style. The first occurred on the eleventh day of the summit: Sadat announced that he was leaving after having an unsatisfactory meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Carter asked to meet with Sadat alone.

"I explained to him," Carter wrote in *Keeping Faith*, "the extremely serious consequences of his unilaterally breaking off the negotiations: that his action would harm the relationship between Egypt and the United States, he would be violating his personal promise to me, and the onus for failure would be on him. I described the possible future progress of Egypt's friendships and alliances—from us to the moderate and then radical Arabs, thence to the Soviet Union. I told him it would damage one of my most precious possessions—his friendship and our mutual trust" (Carter, 1982, p. 392).

The second incident took place on the thirteenth day: the Israelis insisted that the language about Jerusalem was unsatisfactory and that the prospects for agreement were bleak.

Earlier, my secretary, Susan Clough, had brought me some photographs of Begin, Sadat, and me. They had already been signed by President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin had requested that I autograph them for his grandchildren. Knowing the trouble we were in with the Israelis, Susan suggested that she go and get the actual names of the grandchildren, so that I could personalize each picture. I did this, and walked over to Begin's cabin with them. He was sitting on the front porch, very distraught and nervous because the talks had finally broken down at the last minute.

I handed him the photographs. He took them and thanked me. Then he happened to look down and saw that his granddaughter's name was on the top one. He spoke it aloud, and then looked at each photograph individually, repeating the name of the grandchild I had written on it. His lips trembled, and tears welled up in his eyes. He told me a little about each child, and especially about the one who seemed to be his favorite. We were both emotional as we talked quietly

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for a few minutes about grandchildren and about war.
(Carter, 1982, p. 399)

After each of these very personal, very emotional sessions, the stridency of both Sadat and Begin softened. Carter's willingness to address the difficult emotions of these situations paid off.

A tremendous amount of dialogue also went on between the other members of the respective negotiating teams. Carter, Begin, and Sadat had each brought a small number of top aides with them to Camp David, which proved to be extremely important. At particular points, when the leaders became intransigent, the aides and advisers continued to meet and discuss alternatives. In the final hours of the summit, the results of these meetings saved the negotiations from breaking down.

The agreements reached at Camp David were not as comprehensive as Carter had wanted them to be but, by all accounts, were the best that could be attained. Some issues, such as the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai, were deferred to later negotiation. Other issues, like the jurisdiction of Jerusalem, were to be clarified by letters between Carter, Begin, and Sadat, spelling out the details of their resolution. On September 17, 1978, in Washington, Sadat and Begin signed the Camp David Accords, with Jimmy Carter as witness.

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After leaving the White House, Jimmy Carter returned to Georgia and, in 1982, founded the Carter Center, the goal of which was to focus on "issues of public policy through nonpartisan study and research, conferences, and special publications." The center's Program on Conflict Resolution took as its main activity the formation of an "international negotiation network" (INN). The INN was to be an informal affiliation of individuals,

universities, and organizations from around the world, whose objectives included the coordination of conflict resolution efforts in intranational conflicts.

During the Reagan years, Carter's international mediation efforts were discouraged by Washington. As Reagan was preparing to leave the White House, in October 1988, the INN held a working session at the Carter Center to identify and discuss "hot spots" around the world that were not getting attention where the INN might have an impact. In attendance were people from the United Nations and other international and regional organizations involved in monitoring conflicts. According to one of the participants in this meeting, the group adopted several criteria on which to "rank" this list of hot spots. These included loss of life, potential to involve the superpowers, flawed or failed past negotiation efforts, degree of human need (such as significant health and welfare problems), and potential for successful intervention.

The conflicts in the Horn of Africa, involving Ethiopia and the Sudan, reportedly scored high in all criteria. According to Dayle Spencer, director of the center's Conflict Resolution Program, Carter's decision to move first to investigate involvement in the Horn of Africa was based on his concern for the suffering there, due both to war and famine. With the deaths of over one million people, Carter felt the Horn had the greatest need for INN services, so that was where they must begin. (In Ethiopia, the conflict was between the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [PDRE] and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF]. For twenty-eight years, these two groups have been fighting over Eritrea's demands for self-determination. In the Sudan, the disputing parties are the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA].)

In April 1989, Carter led an INN fact-finding team to Ethiopia and the Sudan to explore possibilities for mediation of

the disputes in these countries. Carter enjoyed a better relationship with the Bush administration than he had with the Reagan administration, and he was given access to briefings from the U.S. State Department before departing. Carter and his team also met with former officials of the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments and liberation movements who reside in the United States, as well as with the leaders of private voluntary organizations working in the Horn. In these meetings, Carter's approach was to explain his concerns about the conflicts and ask for the perspective of these people because of their considerable experience in the region.

Carter received State Department assistance in setting up the initial in-country meetings. The disputing parties knew that Carter was trying to talk with everyone involved in the disputes, a difference from past mediation efforts in which some parties were excluded from the dialogue. The team for this first trip included Rosalynn Carter, Dayle Spencer, and William Spencer and William Ury, both professionals in conflict resolution who serve as members of the INN staff.

Carter was received by government and rebel leaders in both countries, including President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and General Secretary Isaias Afwerki of the Eritrean rebels. From descriptions of the exchanges on this trip, Carter's goal in these initial meetings was to gather information about the conflict and the leadership and persuade them to give mediation a try. According to members of his team, he would explain that he was concerned about the suffering of the people in the region and was there to "try to help them work out their differences." As he listened to each person's account of the conflict and what he felt they needed in order to negotiate, he consistently assured the leaders in these first meetings that he understood their position and plight.

Carter's reputation and previous experience in international conflict appeared to have an impact even before any negotiations



began. In the Sudan, for example, the U.S. ambassador gave a party for Carter and invited all of the people from both sides of the conflict with whom Carter had met separately. One can imagine that, in the midst of a civil war, these people did not usually socialize with each other. However, they all attended the party. Carter, it seemed, had been the draw that overcame the political barriers. During the course of the evening, Carter reportedly regaled a table of the most influential guests with his stories of Camp David. The success of that social event lends credence to claims that a successful international mediator must be influential and must have stature—qualities that the former U.S. president has in abundance.

The Carter team prepared for each meeting on the days following by drawing up an agenda and a set of desired outcomes. Sometimes they would split up and meet separately with different officials. Even though the expectations on this first trip were low and the group was aware that caution was needed, a “real sense of excitement” still prevailed, according to Bill Spencer, about the possibility of helping move toward resolution of the dispute.

Carter began assuming a mediator role even before he had been asked to do so. He and his team developed a strategy as to the order in which to visit cities and schedule appointments. In this way, he began to carry “messages” from one group to another as he made his rounds. According to Spencer, he even confronted the Sudanese government officials as to why they were not delivering messages to the rebels themselves. In subtle and not-so-subtle ways, he began to create communication between the parties in these disputes.

Carter ended each meeting with an invitation to visit the Carter Center, considered a flattering proposal by many and one that several of the principal parties later accepted. In the months following this trip, Carter met separately in Atlanta with Afwerki of the EPLF and with the Secretary General of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army. In July 1989, Carter returned to the

Horn of Africa to meet again with government leaders in the two countries. According to one member of the mediation team, Carter used his powers of persuasion with Mengistu by asking the Ethiopian president to consider how much better he would be viewed in the eyes of the world, both now and in coming generations, if he were to be responsible for ending the civil war. Reportedly, Carter drew on his various identities as former president, farmer, engineer, Navy man, father, grandfather, and religious man to establish a "connection" with each person involved in the negotiation process. Making such connections helped him to frame persuasive arguments for taking steps toward peace.

These efforts apparently worked with Mengistu and Afwerki, for they agreed to either come themselves or send representatives to Atlanta and begin building an agenda for negotiations. Carter and the INN staff convened these talks at the Carter Center on September 7, 1989. It was the first time that the PDRE and the EPLF had agreed to talk without preconditions and with the knowledge of the international public. Carter himself made an announcement of the upcoming meeting in the August 18, 1989, *New York Times*. In the *Times* article, the representative of the EPLF to the United States and Canada was quoted as saying, "From our meetings with President Carter—and there were a series of meetings in Atlanta and in Khartoum—we were convinced of his concern for peace and human rights. That is why we decided to continue with his initiative."

Carter is quoted in this same article as attributing the lack of success of previous peace talks to preconditions and the absence of third-party observers. He referred to himself as a "mediator or observer at the talks." He also underscored the importance of publicly announcing the Atlanta meetings, to "force both sides to put forth their most attractive and reasonable proposals and demonstrate a degree of good faith to prevent failure."

Descriptions of the Atlanta meetings show Carter as wanting to set an informal, personal tone in the negotiations. The

delegations did not sit at a table but opposite each other in plush, comfortable chairs and couches in one of the elegant meeting rooms at the center. Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, sat together at the front of the room, with the INN staff close at their side. The staff did not participate in the discussions but communicated suggestions and observations via notes to Carter during the proceedings. Carter and Mrs. Carter, however, talked openly with each other during these meetings, sometimes as if the others were not present. One staff member remarked that this openness had a positive effect on the parties—they could see how diligently Carter was working to assist them.

The first day was devoted to setting a preliminary agenda. The talks were recorded, and Carter asked each side to make an initial presentation to the entire group; thereafter, in both joint meetings and private caucuses, Carter and his team pushed hard on getting through the agenda. During breaks, the mediation team convened to brainstorm and prioritize for the next session.

In the joint sessions, Carter reportedly often took the role of a very strong negotiator, “beating up” on one side and then the other, a process the parties apparently did not like. One staff member characterized it as making the parties negotiate with him rather than with each other. In these bilateral exchanges, Carter would often intimate that there were ways in which he could possibly “help” each party, because of his access to the U.S. government and other world leaders. According to one staff member, Carter could have delivered “about 80 percent” of what he offered.

Between the joint sessions, Dayle and Bill Spencer often met with the delegations at their hotels. According to Bill Spencer, this gave the parties more access to the mediation team, as it was easier for the delegates to approach the staff with information or questions than it was for them to confront Carter himself. It also allowed the mediation team to bring the EPLF “up to speed” on the negotiation process, as they were not as experienced as their

counterparts in the PDRE. Afwerki, the EPLF leader, was staying at the hotel with his team but not participating as a delegate to the talks. This created some confusion about who had the decision-making power for the EPLF and it reportedly took the mediation team some time to sort this out.

After ten days of negotiations, on September 17, 1989, the leaders of the PDRE and EPLF, with Carter as witness, signed an agreement outlining the parameters for future talks. The next round was scheduled for November in Nairobi. While not constituting a settlement of their differences, it was a beginning—and far more than the parties had ever accomplished before.

Carter and his team met with many experts in the field of conflict resolution in preparation for the Nairobi meeting. One participant in these meetings described the Carter group as seeking advice on their mediation role and the structure of this next session. As a result of these consultations and the mediation team's experience in the Atlanta meeting, the Nairobi session was set up a bit differently.

Carter chaired the joint meetings, as before, but many more separate caucuses were held. In these private sessions, Carter and his staff reportedly worked vigorously with the parties to hammer out the language of an agreement, using computer equipment that they had brought with them. Carter himself manned a laptop, testing out phrases, printing out drafts, and presenting them to the parties. This was clearly a repeat of the exhaustive drafting process that had taken place at Camp David.

According to Spencer, the Nairobi meetings exposed the true agenda of the parties. Neither side was really negotiating sincerely. The PDRE was interested in "good press" about their handling of threats to the government; the EPLF wanted international exposure of their plight. Carter therefore "played more hardball" than at previous meetings. At one point, he reportedly threatened to break off the negotiations and "go public" with the insincerity of the parties' negotiation efforts.

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This threat worked after a fashion. The delegations did reach a tentative agreement concerning the format and structure of actual negotiations. However, at the final press conference announcing their agreement, both sides became abusive and attacked Carter, as well as one another. These preliminary talks had held the parties in a de facto ceasefire for several months, but the EPLF resumed military activity before subsequent talks could be convened. Carter and his staff continued to meet with the Ethiopian parties separately throughout 1990, trying to rekindle the negotiations. As of May 1991, the conflict was moving toward resolution. Mengistu had fled to Zimbabwe, leaving his vice president in control of the government. Eritrean militia were marching on the capitol city, Addis Ababa, and U.S.-sponsored talks between the government and the rebel leaders were scheduled to begin in London.

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Even though the Camp David meetings resulted in an agreement and the Ethiopian talks did not, Carter feels he has more potential to settle disputes now than he did as president. The flexibility he now enjoys as a former head of state is a definite advantage. He told me he now has the "total freedom to meet whom I choose. . . . The U.S. government and international organizations are barred from meeting with revolutionary forces, and international organizations can't intervene in the internal affairs of a country." Carter, on the other hand, can pick up the phone and make contact with movers and shakers in the United Nations, the U.S. government, and foreign nations. He is not bound by interest group pressures, the constitutional constraints placed on a head of state, or previous agreements entered into by the U.S. government. This flexibility, he believes, gives him more power as a mediator than he had at Camp David.

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Carter's leverage in his present role comes from several sources. The most significant is his highly personal and moral approach to mediation. In his own words, he "feels an obligation to work in these [intranational civil] disputes" because official parties are forbidden from intervening and because these disputes are often deeply rooted and result in prolonged suffering for the communities involved.

As a mediator, Carter speaks as the "conscience" of the international community. His appeal to world leaders is to do what is right and just for their people. He invoked these themes at Camp David and again with the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders. His words carry weight because Carter himself is known as a person of high personal integrity and spiritual belief. In Dayle Spencer's words, Carter has the "ability to let the world know if parties are not acting in good faith. [Leaders know that he] deals fairly and honestly and [that he] expects others to do the same."

Carter can use this status to apply pressure in a given dispute. His staff talked of his willingness to "put himself and his own reputation at risk." At Camp David, for example, Carter knew he was running a risk, against the counsel of his advisers, in continuing to push Begin and Sadat. He let these leaders each know that if they did not reach an agreement, it would "look bad" for him (domestically and internationally) as well as for them.

In his more recent intervention in Ethiopia, Carter took that same risk, with the stakes being a bit different. He did not stand to lose political capital if the talks failed, as when he was president, but he did run the risk of being considered ineffective or, even worse, detrimental to a resolution. This would not look good on his first try as a citizen diplomat. Carter also would look foolish if he called on his domestic and international connections in the service of an agreement without the parties negotiating in good faith, a fact he no doubt used to pressure Mengistu and Afwerki.

Carter's visibility and his willingness to use the media to mobilize national and international public opinion is another way in which he acts as a voice of morality. As one staff member put it, "when Carter gets involved [in a dispute], the stakes [for the parties] go up." Carter himself believes that his "leverage at Camp David, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua was the same—the ability to arouse public and worldwide attention to the party that is guilty of standing in the way of peace or believes they can act with impunity." (Carter was an observer during the 1990 elections in Nicaragua to verify that the process was "free and fair.")

There are two caveats to the effectiveness of this type of leverage. First, the leadership of the parties in dispute may not care significantly about their or Carter's international reputation. In that case, holding them up to public "shaming" will not affect their behavior in the least. Second, the strategy can backfire. As with the PDRE and the EPLF, the parties may be more interested in using this increased visibility to focus world attention on their separate agendas rather than on settling their dispute.

Carter uses the force of his personality and intellect when he mediates. As shown in both the Camp David and Ethiopian examples, he moves back and forth between mediating and negotiating directly with the parties. He immerses himself in the substance of the negotiations and strongly advocates for particular outcomes. He is, according to Dayle Spencer, a "very, very strong negotiator, one who imposes himself upon the parties to try and get them to agree."

What does Carter think is the most difficult task in mediation? Getting parties to the table. "The most difficult single problem is the first step—getting parties to recognize the status, legitimacy, integrity of the other side. . . . [This is] very difficult in a revolutionary situation. . . . [Parties must ask themselves], 'Are we willing to sit down with the scoundrels, criminals, terrorists whom we've denounced for twenty years?'"

Reflecting on his mediation experiences, Carter outlines three elements he feels are essential for bringing parties together for negotiation. First, the "politicians have to see a *significant* difference between the costs of continuing with the status quo and the benefits of sitting down with the other side. A modest difference isn't enough." Second, a "stalemate is necessary. [Parties must know that they] cannot win on the battlefield." Finally, a "mediator is necessary to handle the proceedings. Begin and Sadat did not meet for the last ten days at Camp David. They needed someone who could go back and forth, knew the details, could work with the associates on both sides."

Some in the field of mediation say that the Carter approach is doomed to fail because any real resolution process depends on working in a region for a long time, building relationships, and establishing trust. Carter's team, some say, "parachutes in" with offers of assistance, raising expectations and then possibly leaving people more discouraged if the negotiations fail. In my opinion, such criticism is a bit harsh. Not having interviewed the PDRE or the EPLF, I would hazard a guess that relations at the end of the negotiations were not worse off than before the talking started. During the ten-month effort, the violence abated. And the parties were able to agree on some procedural issues that may have laid the groundwork for later U.S.-brokered negotiations.

One senior practitioner of international dispute resolution has remarked that Carter has a significant contribution to make in helping communities in conflict, but his challenge is to find the most effective way to make that contribution. Carter shared with me his hope that ensuring free and fair election processes would provide greater stability in the developing nations. His monitoring of such elections, as in Nicaragua, is widely praised. Of course, the rival parties *within* a state must agree in the first instance to allow such elections, and herein often lies the insurmountable source of conflict.

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Carter, however, has proven his ability to bring people together, at the Carter Center and elsewhere. International leaders are prone to trust him because his motivation is not political or monetary gain. He has established a reputation as someone truly interested in using his resources in promoting peace and improving the quality of life in all regions of the world. As previously mentioned, the programs of the Carter Center focus on health, human rights, democratic governance, agricultural development, and hunger relief in addition to conflict resolution. Many newspaper articles in the U.S. press have praised Carter for being the "best ex-president" and for regaining stature after his crushing political defeat by dedicating his ongoing work to public service. It would be hard for a sitting head of state to refuse help from such an individual.

Carter is also continuing to build a track record. As every mediator knows, this is critical in establishing credibility and securing future work. Even though the Ethiopian talks did not produce an agreement, they demonstrated Carter's determination to build on his Camp David experience and his willingness to take risks in highly visible, seemingly intractable disputes. Of late, he seems to have decided, after the Ethiopian experience, to work with less visibility as a mediator.

When Carter concluded the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (a process that took many weeks of work after Camp David), he returned from a grueling trip to the Middle East and wrote in his diary, "I resolved to do everything possible to get out of the negotiating business!" Fortunately, that decision was short-lived. Each time Carter intervenes in a complex international dispute, he gains more experience in the mediation role. With the number of disputes now raging in the world, such experience is sorely needed.

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A postscript: The military regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam was toppled in May 1991 by the forces of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), ending a decades-long civil war between the central government and the rebel movement based in the Ethiopian province of Tigray. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), having successfully dislodged Mengistu's forces from Eritrea prior to his fall, declared independence in May 1993 after a nationwide referendum. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia, led by EPRDF leader Meles Zenawi, is preparing for national elections, planned for 1995, that will put in place a democratic government.

Sudan today is still ravaged by civil war between the northern government of Khartoum and the southern rebel forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The situation has been complicated even more by the fragmentation of the SPLA, with one faction fighting for self-determination and the others calling for secession from the north. The war has dislocated thousands, and some experts report that the humanitarian situation in the south is worse than that of Somalia prior to international intervention in that country in 1992. Since President Carter's initiative in 1989, there have been several unsuccessful attempts to bring lasting peace to Sudan. The most recent talks, convened by the Nigerian government, were in Abuja in May 1993.

Eileen F. Babbitt

Note

1. The Carter Center includes two separate entities: the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which houses the records of Carter's presidential administration, and the nonprofit Carter Center, a consortium of international and domestic programs focused on the promotion of democracy, resolving conflict, preserving human rights, improving health, and fighting hunger.

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